A theory is developed that explains how the stock market can crash in the absence of news about fundamentals, and why crashes are more common than frenzies. A crash occurs via the interaction of rational and naive investors. Naive traders believe in a simple (but reasonable) statistical model of stock prices: that prices follow a random walk with serially correlated volatility. They predict future volatility adaptively, as a weighted average of past squared price changes. From time to time, the rational traders sharply lower their demand for stocks, causing prices to fall. This raises naive investors' assessment of future volatility. Since naive traders are risk averse, their demand for stocks falls and remains low for some time. This lowers the market's risk-bearing ability after the crash and ensures that prices will remain low for a while. Anticipating this, a rational trader has no incentive to bid up prices on the day of the crash.
Introduction
On October 19, 1987 , the S&P 500 index fell by 20.5%. Evidence from option prices suggests that investors expect more crashes to occur. The theory should also explain why crashes happen more often than comparable-sized frenzies, in which prices rise sharply. 3 We present a new theory in which a crash results from the interaction between rational and naive traders. The naive traders are uncertain about the risks of investing in stocks. They assess this risk casually, by following the market's recent movements, rather than by systematically analyzing historical data. We model this by assuming that naive traders believe in a simple statistical price model in which stock prices follow a random walk with serially correlated volatility. 4 Their predictions of future volatility are formed adaptively, as a weighted average of recent squared price changes.
5
The behavior of naive traders may reflect a kind of overconfidence that has been discussed by Shiller, who writes:
One particular kind of overconfidence that appears to be common is a tendency to believe that history is irrelevant, not a guide to the future, and that the future must be judged afresh now using intuitive weighing only of the special factors we see now. This kind of overconfidence discourages taking lessons from past statistics; indeed most financial market participants virtually never study historical data for correlations or other such statistics; they take their anchors instead from casual recent observations. [47, p. 33] There is some historical justification for the idea that the presence of naive traders makes crashes more likely. The largest crashes, in 1929 and 1987, occurred after extended bull markets that attracted many inexperienced investors into the stock market.
The investor Bernard Baruch wrote, in reference to the crash of 1929, When beggars and shoeshine boys, barbers and beauticians can tell you how to get rich, it is time to remind yourself that there is no more dangerous illusion than the belief that one can get something for nothing. (Greenberg [27] ).
In our model, a crash occurs in the following way. The rational traders observe a common signal that acts as a coordinating device. For certain values of this signal, they dump their shares. The resulting crash raises the naive traders' assessment of the risk in the market. Since naive traders are risk averse, they become less willing to own stocks. This lowers the market's risk-bearing capacity. Thus, the price remains lower for some time after the crash. Expecting this, rational traders have no incentive to bid up the stock price on the crash day. This makes the crash a self-fulfilling prophecy.
Importantly, this mechanism does not give rise to frenzies. If rational traders were all to buy shares one day instead of sell, the sharp price increase would also raise the naive traders' estimate of future volatility, prompting them to sell and pushing prices down in the following period. Anticipating this, each rational trader would have an incentive to sell when the others were buying. This is consistent with the empirical rarity of frenzies.
6
This model captures other stylized facts surrounding crashes. Prices jump discontinuously. Some traders -the naive ones -sell in response to prior price changes. In addition, crashes are unexpected: until the crash signal is observed, no one knows a crash is about to happen. This mirrors findings of Bates [7] that option prices indicated no crash fears in the 2 months leading up to the 1987 crash.
In the model, the rational traders sell in response to a common signal that acts that I had blown it and that the market was about to crash. [45, pp. 198-9] 6 Naive traders in the model believe that prices follow a random walk. Thus, they do not believe that price increases will be followed by more increases. If they did believe this (à la the feedback traders of De Long, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldman [17] ), frenzies might also be possible. However, the mechanism we describe would still reduce the sizes of frenzies relative to crashes. 7 In both series, the last data point is the day preceding the crash. This quote defines the representativeness heuristic as irrational. Our theory suggests a rational reason for using the representativeness heuristic: it may serve as a coordinating device for some investors.
Our theory is also related to the "volatility feedback" effect first studied by French, Schwert, and Stambaugh [23] , Malkiel [37] and Pindyck [42] . They point out that greater stock market volatility can lead to a higher risk premium and thus to lower stock prices. 9 Campbell and Hentschel [12] show that this effect can also give rise to negative skew: price declines are larger, on average, than price advances. They assume a fully rational agent who sees dividends that follow a process with serially correlated volatility. Large dividend shocks lead to lower prices since they indicate an increase in volatility and the agent is risk averse. This "volatility feedback effect" dampens the price effects of positive dividend news and exaggerates the price effects of negative dividend news.
While the model of Campbell and Hentschel generates negative skew, it does not give news-free jumps: prices are a continuous function of the dividend shock. One point of our model is that if some traders believe that prices display serially correlated volatility, then their presence in the market can make crashes a self-fulfilling prophecy.
The presence of naive traders is necessary for crashes to occur in our model. The crash makes the naive traders expect high volatility in the future, which reduces their willingness to own stock on the crash day. This lowers the risk-bearing capacity of the market and thus makes a lower price necessary. If there were only rational agents, they would know that the crash was a transitory event and would thus prevent the crash by bidding prices up on the crash day. But while some naivete is needed for a crash to occur, it takes a very mild form: naive traders believe that stock prices follow a random walk with serially correlated volatility. Until recent years, this belief was the orthodox position of the economics community [2, 22, 38, 39] .
In our theory, naive traders fare worse than rational traders. However, the usual criticism is not valid that naive traders cannot play a role in price dynamics since they will eventually be driven from the market. This is because crashes are rare. Most of the investors in the market during the 1987 crash had not even been born in 1929.
Occasional crashes are an essential feature of the aggregate stock market in modern times and appear to be crucial for understanding the empirical patterns of option prices (see note 1). Thus, explaining crashes is a central problem in financial economics. A satisfactory model of crashes should generate asymmetric price jumps from little or no fundamental news. The main drawback of the prior models of crashes is that, by and large, they do not yield asymmetric price jumps.
For example, the models of Gennotte and Leland [24] , Grossman [28] , and Jacklin, Kleidon, and Pfleiderer [31] , explore how rational investors can mistake the informational content of the trades of nonrational investors. These models assume the existence of portfolio insurers, who mechanically sell stocks when prices fall and buy when they rise.
If rational traders underestimate the extent of this behavior, they will mistake it for informed trading. This can magnify the price effects of minor news. 10 The first two papers interpret the crash as coming from such a mistake. Jacklin et al interpret the price increase before the crash as coming from underestimation of portfolio insurance, while the crash itself occurred when informed traders realized their mistake.
The main drawback of these models is that they do not generate skewed returns:
crashes and frenzies are equally likely. In addition, in most of these models, the crash is caused by a misinterpretation by rational investors. One would expect prices to recover quickly as this confusion is cleared up. In practice, prices returned to precrash levels only a year after the 1987 crash. According to our theory, prices can remain low because naive investors remain "crashophobic" after the crash. Indeed, evidence from option prices indicates that crash fears have been present in the years since 1987 but were not present before the crash (Jackwerth and Rubinstein [32] ).
A second group of crash models studies how large price changes can occur if small changes in the environment lead substantial information to be revealed to partially 10 A related model is Barlevy and Veronesi [5] , in which all investors are rational and some are uninformed. A price decline signals negative information to the uninformed investors, which lowers the price further, which signals the possibility of even worse information, and so on. [44] , and Zeira [51] . Like the first group of models, these do not explain why crashes are more common than frenzies.
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The model of Grossman and Zhou [29] , while not aimed at explaining crashes, does yield some of their properties. They study a model with symmetric information and two types of risk averse investors who each maximize expected consumption utility. One type, the "portfolio insurers," have an additional constraint that their wealth must not fall before a certain level. As fundamentals worsen, the portfolio insurers sell stock at an accelerating rate, leading to an increase in volatility. This model does not yield news-free price jumps.
De Long, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldman [17] assume two groups of investors. One group is fully rational. The other is composed of "feedback traders" who chase trends, buying after prices rise and selling after they fall. This leads rational traders to react to news in an exaggerated way: if the news is good, they drive prices exaggeratedly high since they know that the feedback traders will pay even more the next period. This model does not generate skewed returns.
Barberis, Huang, and Santos [3] link excess volatility to psychological evidence that prior gains make investors less risk averse since they are "playing with house money."
An increase in stock prices leads investors to invest more in stocks, pushing prices yet higher; a price decline makes investors more risk averse, leading them to sell their shares.
This model does not yield skewed returns or news-free price jumps.
Barsky and De Long [6] suggest that excess volatility is driven by investor uncertainty about the dividend growth rate. They assume that investors form their expectations of future growth rates adaptively, as a geometrically weighted average of past growth rates. In periods of sustained dividend growth, investors become more optimistic about future growth, which can cause large changes in the price-earnings ratio. This model does not yield skewed returns or news-free jumps.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains the naive traders' beliefs. The model is presented in section 3 and solved in section 4.
Naive Traders' Beliefs
Let p t be the stock price in period t. Let E Naive t denote the naive traders' time t expectation and let V t represent the naive traders' time t estimate of the variance of p t+1 :
denotes the naive traders' expectation at time t, after they have observed p t .)
We make two assumptions about naive traders' beliefs:
A1. Random Walk Beliefs. The naive traders believe that prices follow a random
A2. Adaptive Volatility Expectations. The naive traders form their prediction of future volatility adaptively. That is, V t is a weighted sum of the realized variance in period t and the predicted variance:
Combining A1 and A2, we obtain
The naive traders' time t prediction of time t + 1 variance is a weighted sum of the squared price change in period t and their time t − 1 prediction of the time t variance. [46] . Sharpe also discusses how one can predict future volatility using historic volatility, and why it is worthwhile to put more weight on recent returns [46, p. 441] . Equation (1) is an example of this: by substituting repeatedly for V on the right hand side, one can express V t as a geometric weighted sum of past squared returns:
From day to day, the serial correlation of volatility is much stronger than the serial correlation of returns. 14 Evidence for this comes from MacKinlay and Ramaswamy [36] , who compute daily autocorrelations in log returns for the S&P 500 index and for futures contracts on this index during the 1983-1987 period. (1) is, indeed, a simple GARCH model.
The Model
The game takes place in periods t = 0, 1, 2, 3. There is a measure µ of rational traders and 1 − µ of naive traders. The rational traders know the model and which equilibrium is being played.
There are two assets: one ("stocks"), in fixed unit supply, pays an i.i.d. dividend δ t ∼ N (δ, σ 2 ) after the end of trading in each period t = 0, 1, 2, and a fixed liquidating dividend of D (whose value is specified below) in period 3. 16 The other asset, bonds, is in infinitely elastic supply and pays interest of r after trading in each period.
The assumption of i.i.d. dividends implies that there is no fundamental news that is relevant to the stock price. This stylized assumption is made to show that crashes can occur without any fundamental news. Serially correlated dividend shocks, while perhaps making the model more realistic, would obscure this point without essentially changing the results.
The sequence of events is as follows.
Period 0. No signals are observed and all traders trade. The role of this period is to 15 Author's tabulation from Econlit. 16 The role of dividend shocks is to make stocks a risky investment, creating realistic limits to arbitrage.
In the real world, this riskiness comes not only from actual dividends but also from liquidity shocks, macroeconomic news, and so on. Thus, the term "dividends" should not be taken literally.
permit optimal risk-sharing and to establish a base price p 0 for the stock. At the end of the period, the dividend δ 0 per share is announced and distributed.
Period 1. The rational traders observe a common signal θ ∼ U [0, 1] that has no direct relevance to anyone's payoff. 17 All traders then trade at some price p 1 . Finally, the dividend δ 1 is announced and paid. A crash will occur, if at all, in period 1, since this is when the common signal θ is observed.
Period 2. All traders trade at some price p 2 , and then the dividend δ 2 is announced and paid.
Period 3. The liquidating dividend D is paid. There is no trade in this period.
When trade takes place, agents simultaneously submit demand functions: the quantity of shares they wish to buy at each price. The market-clearing price is determined by the condition that the demand for stocks equal the unit supply, 1.
If an agent buys x t shares of stock in period t, costing her p t x t , her wealth in period t + 1 is
Agents maximize expected utility EU (
, where λ is the coefficient of absolute risk aversion.
To obtain a simple expression for traders' demand for stocks, we use an approximation that holds exactly if agents believe that the next period's stock price will be normally distributed. This implies that a rational agent's demand for stocks x R t in periods t = 0, 1, 2, equals the expected difference between stock and bond returns, E(p t+1 − p t ) + δ − rp t , divided by λ times the variance of the stock return p t+1 + δ t+1 :
where the expectation and variance are conditioned on all information available at time t (including p t ). 18 This formula also holds in period 2, when rational agents know that p 3 will equal D for sure.
The normal approximation has negligible effects on the model's results. We will study equilibria in which the rational agents know the path of prices that will ensue after the signal is observed in period 1. Thus, from period 1 onwards, their return risk comes solely from the normally distributed dividend shock. Prior to this, the only price risk comes from the chance of a crash, which we assume to be small enough that its price effect is negligible. Thus, the normal dividend shock dominates the return distribution before the crash as well.
The naive traders know that δ t ∼ N(δ, σ 2 ) and believe that the ex-dividend return p t+1 − p t is normally distributed 19 with mean 0 and variance V t that is determined by (1) . Substituting these into (3), we obtain the demand x N t of a naive trader:
The condition for market clearing is
where x R t and x N t are given above. Since there is no history in period 0, V 0 = 0; in period 1,
This is the unique final dividend for which there is an equilibrium with a constant price, 20 We call p the variance-free price.
Solving the Model
We first show that there is only one constant-price equilibrium:
Proposition 1 There is only one constant-price equilibrium. In this equilibrium, the price always equals p =
Proof. By setting V t = E(p t+1 − p t ) = Var (p t+1 ) = 0 in (5), one finds that the price must always equal p.
Proposition 2 shows that even if the price is not a constant, it can never exceed the variance-free price. This places a tight limit on the size of any frenzy: it cannot exceed the difference between the variance-free price and the price in period zero.
Proposition 2
In any equilibrium, the stock price can never exceed the variance-free price, p.
Proof. Appendix A.
The intuition for Proposition 2 is as follows. In a given equilibrium, let p max be the maximum price that can be attained in any period. When the price is p max , rational traders must expect the next period's return to be zero or negative. Naive traders, by assumption, expect it to be zero. Agents' expected returns in the constant price equilibrium are at least as optimistic as this; furthermore, agents in the constant-price equilibrium expect zero volatility. So if the price is p max , stocks cannot offer a more attractive return distribution to either type of agent than in the constant-price equilibrium. But then no agent will ever be willing to pay more than the price in that equilibrium, which is p; hence, p max ≤ p.
In addition to the equilibrium in which the price is constant at the variance-free price p, there are other equilibria in which the price sometimes crashes in period 1 and partially recovers in period 2.
First consider the price in period 0. A crash will occur, if at all, in period 1, since this is when the rational traders observe their signal. 21 We focus on equilibria in which crashes are rare: in which E(p 1 −p 0 ) ≈ 0 and V ar(p 1 ) ≈ 0. Since V 0 = 0, one can easily verify by (5) that p 0 must be arbitrarily close to p. The crash risk is small enough that it has a negligible effect on the precrash price, which is why the normal approximation to rational traders' demand functions can be used.
Given this, market clearing in period 2 requires (using the approximation p 0 ≈ p)
A crash can be a self-fulfilling prophecy because of the term αβ(p 1 − p) 2 in the denominator of the second fraction. This term means that a price decrease in period 1 lowers naive trader demand in period 2, making a lower price necessary in period 2. Since a decrease in p 1 lowers p 2 , rational traders have no incentive to bid up the price in period 1 if they expect it to be low.
In general, (6) may have multiple solutions p 2 for given p 1 . We will focus on equilibria in which the rational traders know which value of p 2 will occur following each possible value of p 1 . Let this function be p 2 (p 1 ).
If rational traders expect p 2 to follow the price p 1 , then their demand in period 1 is
, so the market-clearing condition in period 1 is
This implicitly defines a function p 1 (p 2 ). Since the left hand side is decreasing in p 1 (for p 1 ≤ p) and increasing in p 2 , the function p 1 (p 2 ) is increasing. By (7), it satisfies
Finally, the period-zero price p 0 satisfies
We look for equilibria in which crashes are rare, so E(p 1 − p 0 ) ≈ 0 and V ar(p 1 ) ≈ 0.
By (8) , p 0 ≈ p.
The equilibrium price functions appear in Figure 2 . The short-dashed line is the price in period 2 raises rational agents' willingness to pay in period 1. The solid curve is p 2 (p 1 ), which is also increasing as explained above: if p 1 is closer to p, naive agents predict less volatility in period 2, which raises the market price in period 2.
The curves intersect three times, each corresponding to a possible pair of prices (p 1 , p 2 ). The highest intersection is at p 1 = p 2 = p = 10, which is the price path if rational traders don't see a crash signal in period 1. The middle intersection is at (p 1 , p 2 ) = (7.11315, 8.30577); the lowest intersection is (p 1 , p 2 ) = (4.41318, 6.93192). By continuity, for sufficiently small ε > 0 there is an equilibrium in which p 0 ≈ p = 10 and with probability 1 − ε there is no crash; with probability ε, there is a crash in which prices (p 1 , p 2 ) are very close to one of the lower intersections of the two curves in Figure   2 .
A Proof of Proposition 2
Let p max be the supremum of the set of prices reached with positive probability. For any ε > 0 there is a period t and a signal θ such that p t is within ε of p max . There are now two cases. However,
which must exceed 1, so
In all cases, p max < p+kε for a fixed constant k. Since this is true for all ε, p max ≤ p.
Q.E.D. 22 Naive traders believe that the capital gains return is normally distributed, so the normal approximation always holds exactly for them.
